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1. INTRODUCTION
In March 1997, a Canadian subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
faced an increasingly common dilemma. United States authorities
demanded that it comply with U.S. sanctions regulations by end-
ing sales in Canada of clothing that is manufactured in Cuba. At
the same time, Canadian authorities insisted that Wal-Mart Can-
ada Ltd. continue to carry the Cuban-origin products or face fines
of up to C$1.5 million for noncompliance with countermeasures
designed to neutralize the impact of U.S. sanctions.1 The com-
pany's first response was to remove the items from its stores, but
it reversed course within two weeks. After apparently deciding
that the risk of liability was more severe under Canadian law,
Wal-Mart Canada announced that it was restocking its shelves
with Cuban-origin clothing.2 A U.S. government spokesman
later stated that U.S. officials are considering whether or not to
take action against Wal-Mart?
This Article reviews U.S. extraterritorial sanctions, counter-
measures established by other jurisdictions, difficulties that arise
when the two overlap and possible means of dealing with con-
flicting legal requirements. Section 2 outlines foremost U.S. sanc-
tions that have an extraterritorial scope: (1) embargo regulations,
* Counsel, Dewey Ballantine LLP, Washington, D.C. The author thanks
Frederick Broen, Jennifer Clark, Peter Fitzmaurice, Alannah Link, Ian
O'Donnell, Frank Schweitzer and Kimberly Shaw for their assistance with this
Article.
' Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §7(1)(a) (1985)
(Can.) [hereinafter FEMA], as amended by Act to Amend the Foreign Extra-
territorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 28, §6 (1997) (Can.) [hereinafter Act to
Amend FEMA].
2 See Treasury Reviewing Wal-Mart Canada Decision to Sell Cuban-Made Pa-
jamas, DAILY REP. FOR EXEcUTIVEs (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at A14.
' See Norman Kempster, Wal-Mart May Face Sanctions Over Cuban PJs Pol-
icy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1997, at D1.
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particularly as they apply to U.S.-owned or controlled foreign
companies and to reexports of U.S.-origin items by foreign per-
sons; (2) recent statutes that strengthen extraterritorial sanctions
against Cuba, specifically the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and
1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
or "Helms-Burton Act" as it is popularly known; and (3) the 1996
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which mandates "secondary boy-
cott" sanctions against foreign persons who pursue major petro-
leum-related investments in Iran or Libya.
Section 3 reviews countermeasures established by the Euro-
pean Union ("EU"), Canada, Mexico and others in response to
extraterritorial U.S. sanctions. The principal elements of these
countermeasures forbid compliance with U.S. sanctions ("block-
ing" provisions), prohibit recognition of judgments under U.S.
sanctions and authorize recovery of damages attributable to
judgments handed down under U.S. sanctions ("clawback" provi-
sions).
Section 4 describes challenges to U.S. extraterritorial sanctions
under international trade agreements and related negotiations to
reconcile U.S. and foreign policies. Dispute settlement initiatives
have not been pursued to a decision, but negotiations have not
succeeded in freeing companies from conflicting national laws.
This is true notwithstanding agreements that the United States
and the EU concluded in May 1998 that were intended to address
EU concerns about extraterritorial sanctions and the United
States' desire for coordinated sanctions policies, particularly with
respect to Cuba. Key arrangements are contingent on enactment
of U.S. legislation to insulate EU persons from the Helms-Burton
Act alien-exclusion provisions, but prospects are minimal of such
legislation passing the Congress in the foreseeable future.
Section 5 assesses the potential legal liability and other prob-
lems for a company that, like Wal-Mart, is caught between the
dictates of U.S. sanctions and foreign countermeasures.
Section 6 identifies possible means of minimizing risks of dif-
ficulty for companies that might face this conundrum. Careful
formulation and implementation of internal guidelines can be of
substantial benefit. The first and most important step is to make
informed, advance decisions about how to address conflicting le-
gal requirements rather than waiting for problems to arise.
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2. KEY U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL SANCTIONS
The United States maintains scores of legal measures that are
extraterritorial in the sense that they seek to affect the conduct of
foreign persons outside the United States. At present, the extra-
territorial measures described below attract the most strenuous
objections from other countries and are the foremost targets of
sanctions countermeasures. They are particularly controversial
because they attempt to induce foreign persons abroad to forego
economic activity in order to advance the foreign policy goals of
the U.S. government. The United States' trading partners com-
plain that these measures unjustifiably encroach on sovereign
rights of self-government.4
2.1. Embargo Regulations
The United States maintains broad trade and investment em-
bargoes against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Sudan.
The principal embargo requirements are embodied in regulations
administered by the Department of the Treasury.? The embar-
' U.S. sanctions directed at overseas transfers of items based on national
security- rather than foreign policy- rationale have not generated as much
controversy, presumably due to a consensus among developed countries that
controls are needed on such items. Such sanctions include, for example, secon-
dary boycott measures relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. S 2798 (1994); 50 U.S.C. app. 5 2410(c)(1994) (setting
forth chemical and biological weapons proliferation sanctions).
s See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1998); Prohib-
iting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997);
Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1998); Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 575 (1998); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
pt. 550 (1998); Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1998);
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 538 (1998). Other regulations
administered by the Treasury Department impose sanctions against foreign in-
dividuals and entities designated as narcotics traffickers, Narcotics Trafficking
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 536 (1998), and foreign individuals and
entities designated as terrorists, Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt.
595 (1998); Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt.
596 (1998); Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
pt. 597 (1998). The Treasury Department also administers a ban on new in-
vestment in Burma, Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537(1998),
and the blocking of property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and a ban on new investment in Serbia,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Kosovo Sanctions
Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 54,576-85 (1998) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 586).
The Treasury Department has authorized prospective transactions involving
property in which the Government of Montenegro has an interest. See Federal
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goes' export-related prohibitions are reinforced and broadened in
some respects by the Export Administration Regulations
("EAR") administered by the Department of Commerce.6 The
U.S. embargo on Iraq is less of a source of friction with other
countries because, unlike the other five, it is in harmony with
multilateral sanctions requirements!
The U.S. embargoes are extraterritorial in two important re-
spects. First, the embargoes of Cuba and North Korea purport to
preclude foreign companies that are owned or controlled by U.S.
persons from conducting business with Cuba or North Korea.
This aspect of the Cuba sanctions arose as an issue for Wal-Mart's
Canadian subsidiary. Second, the embargo regulations generally
purport to forbid foreign persons to export to the embargoed
country most items that are of U.S. origin or that contain U.S.
content (e.g., U.S.-origin parts). Such third-country transactions
are referenced, collectively, as "reexports."' While the adminis-
tering agencies can license these transactions, by and large, the
agencies apply a general policy of license denial for embargoed
destinations.9
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Kosovo Sanctions Regula-
tions, 63 Fed. Reg. at 54,584.
6 See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-74 (1998).
Prior to its expiration on August 20, 1994, the Export Administration Act
provided the primary statutory basis for the EAR. Since that time, the EAR
have been maintained under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994). Exports andreex-
ports of military-related items ("defense articles" and "defense services") are
controlled by the State Department under the Arms Export Control Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. I 1996), and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (1998). The State Department maintains a
policy of license denial for shipments to the embargoed countries. See 22
C.F.R. § 126.1.
7 See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990).
8 U.S. regulations are not always clear as to whether the term "reexport"
covers third-country exports of items that include U.S. content, but theEAR's
definition of the term suggests that it does. See 15 C.F.R. S 734.2(b)(4),
734.3(a)(3) (1998). In some circumstances, the EAR also forbid thereexport
and export from abroad to some locations of the foreign-produced product of
controlled technology and software. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2b) (3).
9 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. S 746.2(b) (implementing policy of denial for Cuba).
But see 15 C.F.R. § 746.4(c) (imp ementing limited policy of license denial f6r
Libya). As regards trade with Cuba by foreign, U.S.-owned or controlled
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2.1.1. Application of Cuban and North Korean Embargoes to
U.S.-Owned or Controlled Foreign Companies
The embargo regulations applicable to Cuba ("Cuban Assets
Control Regulations" or "CACR") and to North Korea ("For-
eign Assets Control Regulations" or "FACR") contain asset-
blocking provisions that broadly prohibit business with these
countries. These provisions forbid "[a]ll dealings" in property by
"any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," if
such dealings involve property in which Cuba, North Korea or a
Cuban or North Korean national has "any interest of any nature
whatsoever, direct or indirect."" Courts have construed these
provisions expansively." The Treasury Department considers
them to ban activity with only an attenuated connection to the
target country, such as an aircraft lease to a third-country airline
if some of the subject aircraft will be used, in part, for routes to
and from Cuba.
The extraordinary scope of these provisions derives primarily
from the regulations' definition of "person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States"; the phrase embraces not just U.S. citi-
zens and residents, persons in the United States and corporations
organized under U.S. law ("U.S. persons"), but also "[a]ny corpo-
ration, partnership, or association, wherever organized or doing
business, that is owned or controlled by" such persons.12 By their
10 Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. SS 500.201(b) (1998)
[hereinafter FACR]; Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b)
(1998) [hereinafter CACR]. The FACR continue to have some applicability to
property in which there exists a Cambodian or Vietnamese interest, but the
regulations provide blanket authorization for future transactions relating to
such property (apart from transactions relating to property blocked in the
name of the Exchange Support Fund for the Khmer Republic). See 31 C.F.R.
S§ 500.570, 500.578.
" See, e.g., United States v. Broverman, 180 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (discussing how China retained an "interest," within the meaning of the
FACR, in pro duct that was exported from China to Canada and then to the
United States).
12 31 C.F.R. S 500.329 (regarding North Korea); 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (re-
garding Cuba). Apart from the reexport requirements discussed in Section
2.1.2., the U.S. embargoes against Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan generally apply
to "U.S. persons," a narrower term which excludes all foreign-chartered com-
panies. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.201-.209, .314 (Iran) ; 31 C.F.R. S 575.201-.210, .321
Iraq);*31 C.F.R. § 550.201-.208, .308 (Libya); 31 C.F.R. § 538.201-209, .315
Sudan). A U.S. parent company could, however, be prosecuted for actions of
its foreign subsidiaries that are contrary to the Iran, Iraq, Libya or Sudan em-
bargoes under principles of agency, accomplice or conspiracy liability if it di-
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terms, then, the regulations ban, for example, a bank operating in
and organized under the laws of Spain from guaranteeing a loan
to a Cuban firm if the bank is owned or controlled by U.S. per-
sons. This makes the sanctions controversial internationally
since, under customary international law, a company is ordinarily
considered to be a national of the state under the laws of which it
is organized.3
In 1975, the Treasury Department amended the CACR to an-
nounce that it would, "in appropriate cases," issue licenses for
otherwise prohibited trade transactions relating to Cuba by for-
eign U.S.-owned or controlled companies if specified criteria were
satisfied. 4 The new policy facilitated trade between Cuba and
overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies valued at an estimated
$718 million in 1991.'5 In 1992, this relaxation of the Cuban em-
bargo was terminated by the "Mack Amendment," a portion of
the Cuban Democracy Act which forbids the issuance of licenses
pursuant to the 1975 policy.16
The CACR and FACR both contain another provision that
carries the potential for extraterritorial application of these em-
bargoes. The regulations prohibit "[a]ll transfers outside the
United States with regard to any property or property interest
rects or facilitates those actions. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994); Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949); Morgan v. United States, 149 F.2d
185, 187 (5th Cir. 1945). But see J. Ellicott, Sovereignty and the Regulation of
International Business in the Export Control Arena, 20 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 133, 136
(1994) (discussing how under an "extreme construction[]" maintained by"some of the regulators in Washington," the regulations preclude a parent
company from telling its foreign subsidiary that"it is okay to go ahead" with a
transaction that falls within the terms of a prohibition).
13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 213 (1987).
4 See 40 Fed. Reg. 47,108 (1975) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1976)).
According to a Treasury Department official, the agency issued licenses auto-
matically under Section 515.599 provided the regulatory criteria were satisfied.
See Clara David, Trading with Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and Export
Rules, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 385, 387 (1993). The 1975 amendment replaced a
qualified general license permitting certain transactions by foreign, U.S.-owned
or controlled, non-banking companies with Cuba. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.541
(1963-75).
15 See David, supra note 14, at 388.
16 See Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102484, S 1706(a), 106Stat.
2315, 2578 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a) (1994)); accord 31 C.F.R.
515.559(a) (1998). The statute permits the issuance of licenses to foreign,
U.S.-owned or controlled companies for contracts executed before October 23,
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" if such trans-
actions involve property in which Cuba, North Korea or a Cu-
ban or North Korean national has "any interest of any nature
whatsoever, direct or indirect.""7 The regulations do not define
"property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" other
than to identify certain types of securities as examples of such
property. 8 The U.S. government could potentially invoke these
provisions to seize U.S.-origin or U.S.-owned property that is in-
volved in a transaction relating to Cuba or North Korea even if
no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction is involved. Such action
would be based on the theory that the property's U.S. origin or
ownership renders it subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 9
2.1.2. Prohibitions on Reexports by Foreign Persons
The embargoes uniformly prohibit U.S. persons- individuals
who are U.S. citizens, U.S. residents or in the United States and
U.S.-chartered companies- to export most goods, technology
and services to a sanctioned destination or person regardless of the
17 31 C.F.R. SS 500.201(b), 515.201(b) (1998).
18 31 C.F.R. S 500.313, 515.313. The definitions specify that the term in-
cludes, "without limitation," securities: (1) issued by the U.S. Government, a
sub-federal government or a person within the United States, or (2) for which
the instruments evidencing the securities are located in the United States. See
id.
19 Some Treasury Department officials have indicated that they construe
the CACR and FACR generally not to extend to overseas transactions that do
not involve persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, but this view could change
based on political developments relating to Cuba and North Korea. The
United States appears, in other contexts, to rely on the U.S. origin of property
to bring, in its view, transactions within U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. In gen-
eral, the U.S. origin of a reexported item (or the content therein) provides the
only apparent basis on which one can argue that the prescriptive jurisdiction
exercised through U.S. reexport sanctions is consistent with international law.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 13, at
S 431, comment (d) (implying that prescriptive jurisdiction forreexport con-
trols is reasonable due to the U.S. origin of the items). It reportedly has been
argued that EAR reexport controls are justified based on the foreignparty hav-
ing consented to the application of the regulations by executing end-use state-
ments .and written assurances, which are required for the licensing of some
strategic exports. See HOMER E. MOYER, JR. & LINDA A. MABRY, EXPORT
CONTROLS AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 110-11 (1989). But no such
documents are involved in the vast bulk of possible reexport transactions that
fall under U.S. sanctions regulations, for example, reexports from Spain to
Cuba of U.S.-origin bottling equipment, which are prohibited under 15 C.F.R.
S 746.2(a) (1998).
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location from which the export is made (from the United States
or elsewhere) .2' To varying degrees, the embargoes also purport
to forbid non-U.S. persons from reexporting U.S.-origin items
from third countries to sanctioned destinations (and, sometimes,
sanctioned governments). These controls can be summarized as
follows:
Cuba: The EAR forbid reexports by any person to Cuba of
most U.S.-origin commodities, software and technology and such
items that contain a super-de minimis level of U.S. content.2 1 Un-
der the EAR, U.S. content is generally de minimis for exports to
the embargoed countries if it is ten percent or less of the export's
value.' As discussed above, the CACR also prohibit reexports to,
and other transactions with, Cuba and Cuban nationals by U.S.-
owned or controlled, foreign-chartered companies, and these
regulations contain no de minimis limitation.'
Iraq: The Treasury Department's Iraqi Sanctions Regulations
prohibit reexports to Iraq, the Iraqi government and entities
owned or controlled by the Iraqi government of most goods,
technology and services that are "subject to U.S. jurisdiction."2"
As discussed above, the meaning of "subject to U.S. jurisdiction"
is unclear but could be construed to comprehend jurisdiction
based merely on an item's U.S. origin or incorporation of U.S.
content. 5
20 See 31 C.F.R. S 515.201(b)(1)(d) (1998) (Cuba); Exec. Order No. 13,059,
2(a), 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997) (Iran); 31 C.F.R. 575.205 (1998) (Iraq); 31
C.F.R. S 550.209 (Libya) (listing items in which the Libyan government has an
interest); 31 C.F.R. § 500.201(b)(1) (North Korea); 31 C.F.R. § 538.205 (Sudan).
21 See 15 C.F.R. 746.2(a), 734.3(3) (1998).
22 See 15 C.F.R. 734.4(b). The EAR provide that the Commerce De-
partment will "consider[] favorably on a case-by-case basis" approval of license
applications for exports from thirdcountries to Cuba of"non-strate~ic foreign-
made products that contain an insubstantial proportion of U.S.-origin materi-
als, parts, or components" if specified criteria are satisfied. See 15 C.F.R.
746.2b)(3). In general, this policy does not apply to U.S.-owned or con-
trolled foreign companies. See 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(b)(3).
' See sapra Section 2.1.1. The CACR prohibition on transactions with
Cuba that involve property subject to U.S. jurisdiction could also be invoked
to block any reexport to Cuba, whether or not a U.S. person is involved. See
id.
24 31 C.F.R. § 575.205 (1998).
al See supra Section 2.1.1. EAR restrictions on reexports to Iraq are gener-
ally limited to items otherwise controlled for particular national security and
foreign policy reasons, but, again, the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations extend tore-
exports of virtually all U.S.-origin items. See 15 C.F.R. § 746.3(a) (1998). The
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Iran: The Iran sanctions' reexport ban is more limited. Un-
der the controlling executive order, reexports by non-U.S. per-
sons of goods, technology and services that have been exported
from the United States are forbidden if: 1) they are effected "with
knowledge or reason to know" that the reexport is "intended
specifically for" Iran, the Iranian government or entities owned
or controlled by the Iranian government; and 2) such goods,
technology or services were subject to a U.S. license requirement
for exports from the United States to Iran as of May 6, 1995 or af-
terward.26  The broadest license requirements are those of the
EAR, which control exports and reexports to Iran of a variety of
items for national security and foreign policy purposes, particu-
larly for reasons relating to efforts against terrorism.2' The execu-
tive order exempts from the reexport prohibition administered by
the Treasury Department goods and technology that have been:
(1) "substantially transformed" outside the United States or (2) as
in the EAR, incorporated into a foreign-made product outside the
United States and constitute less than ten percent of the value of
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, among other things, mandates the continued impo-
sition of the embargo embodied in the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations and gener-
ally forbids the issuance of licenses for exports to Iraq under the EAR and
other regulations. See Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 101-513, §§ 586C, 586G,
104 Stat. 2048, 2051(1990) (codified at 50 U.S.C. S 1701 note (1994)).
26 Exec. Order No. 13,059, %$ 2(b), 4(d), 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997). As
this Article is completed, the Treasury Department's Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560, have not been amended to render them in full
conformity with Exec. Order No. 13,059.
The May 6, 1995 demarcation reflects the effective date of the executive
order that first established a comprehensive embargo against Iran. See Exec.
Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995). Export sanctions maintained
under the national emergency declared in Exec. Order No. 12,957- including
those of Exec. Order No. 13,059 and the Iranian Transaction Regulations- are
not considered to be license requirements for purposes of determining the
scope of the reexport ban established by Exec. Order No. 13,059. See Exec.
Order No. 13,059, § 2(b)(ii), 60 Fed. Reg. 44,531.
27 See 15 C.F.R. 5§ 742.8(a), 746.7 (1998). Apart from the EAR, other
regulatory regimes- such as the State Department's International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (1998), and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's restrictions on nuclear exports, 10 C.F.R. pt. 110 (1998)- also
imposed license requirements on exports to Iran as of May 6, 1995 and after-
ward. The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, in conjunction with
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, generally forbids the issuance of licenses for exports
to Iran under the EAR and other regulations. See International Emergency
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1994); Iraq Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
513, §§ 586C, 586G, 104 Stat. 2048, 2051 (1990) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701
note (1994)).
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that product.
Libya: The EAR forbid reexports to Libya of most U.S.-
origin commodities, software and technology and such items that
contain a super-de minimis level of U.S. content, although the
regulations indicate that licenses can be obtained to reexport some
controlled items.29
North Korea: Reexport sanctions against North Korea gener-
ally mirror those against Cuba."
Sudan: The Sudan sanctions' reexport ban, like the Iran sanc-
tions, is significantly limited. Under the Treasury Department's,
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, reexports by non-U.S. persons of
goods, technology and services are forbidden only if they are sub-
ject to another federal agency's license requirement." Again, the
broadest relevant reexport requirements are those of the EAR.
Although not comprehensive, EAR controls on reexports to Su-
dan are, as with Iran, unusually expansive because these countries
have been designated as repeated supporters of international ter-
32rorism.
U.S. reexport controls applicable to countries other than em-
bargoed destinations generate far less controversy because they
are narrowly targeted at transfers of military, "dual use" and
other strategic items which are typically subject to similar export
controls maintained by other industrialized countries.33
28 See Exec. Order No. 13,059, § 2(b)(ii)(A), (B). Areexport could be sub-
ject to a license requirement administered by an agency other than the Treas-
ury Department notwithstanding that it enjoys an exemption under Exec. Or-
der No. 13,059.
29 See 15 C.F.R. % 746.4(b)(2), 746.4(c)(2) (1998). The Treasury Depart-
ment's Libyan Sanctions Regulations do not contain an express reexport pro-
hibition. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1998).
30 Compare 15 C.F.R. § 746.5 (1998) with 15 C.F.R. S 746.2. Compare 31
C.F.R. S 500.201(b) with 31 C.F.R. S 515.201(b).
31 See 31 C.F.R. § 538.205 (1998).
32 See 31 C.F.R. S 742.10. The Secretary of State has determined that the
governments of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria have
repeatedly rovided support for acts of international terrorism under Section
6)(1)(A)ofthe Exp ort Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050)(1)(A). See
15 C.F.R. § 742.1(d) (1998). Consequently, broad antiterrorism export con-
trols are mandatory with respect to these countries under section 60) the pol-
icy of which is continued by executive order notwithstanding the statute's
lapse. See supra note 6. Antiterrorism controls are of less significance with re-
spect to Cuba, Iraq, Libya and North Korea since the embargoes establish in-
dependent, comprehensive bans on exports and reexports to these countries.
3' Four multilateral regimes pursue coordinated export control policies in
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2.1.3. Penalties and Enforcement
The U.S. government enforces the embargo regulations
through criminal and administrative sanctions. For example, un-
der the Trading With the Enemy Act and other measures, pun-
ishment for willful violations of the embargoes of Cuba and
North Korea can include fines of $250,000 and imprisonment for
ten years for individuals (including officers, directors, and agents
of corporate offenders), and fines of $1 million for companies.34
The Treasury Department is authorized to issue civil penalties of
up to $50,000 for noncompliance with the Cuba and North Korea
embargoes." Violations of the other embargoes are punishable
through sanctions authorized by the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act and other measures.36
The U.S. government's ability to prosecute a foreign-
chartered company for an embargo violation depends on securing
personal jurisdiction over the company. In any event, the Treas-
ury Department sometimes pressures U.S. companies to force
their foreign subsidiaries to comply with embargo regulations
that extend to all U.S.-owned or controlled entities (now, the
particular areas: (1) the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms and
ual-use goods and technologies; (2) the Australia Group for chemical weapons
precursors, organisms of biological warfare significance and precursors; (3) the
Missile Technology Control Regime for ballistic missiles and other means of
air delivery of weapons of mass destruction; and (4) the Nuclear Suppliers
Group for nuclear material and nuclear-related dual-use items. See, e.g., Cecil
Hunt & Evan R. Berlack, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 11, 14-15, 25-26 (Practising Law Institute, ed., 1996).
" See Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. 5 16(a) (1994
& Supp. II 1996); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
3571b) (1994); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18
U.S.C.
S 2332(0) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Fines can extend as high as twice the pecuni-
ary gain from the offense or loss to a person other than the defendant. See 18
U.S.C. 5 3571(b) & (d) (1994).
" See Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. S 16(b) (1994
& Supp. I 1996); Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act, 28 U.S.C.
S 2461 (1994). Items that are used in connection with violations are subject to
forfeiture. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16.
36 The Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan embargoes are maintained under the
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")
and, depending on the embargo, other statutes. The IEEPA authorizes fines
and imprisonment of up to $50,000 and 10 years, respectively, and civil penal-
ties of up to $10,000 for violations of IEEPA-based embargoes. See 50 U.S.C.
5 1705 (1994).
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CACR and FACR). In a famous such instance, Treasury directed
Fruehauf, a U.S. vehicle manufacturer, to prevent a shipment of
buses by its French subsidiary to the Peoples' Republic of China,
then subject to a comprehensive U.S. embargo.3 Depending on
the circumstances, U.S. authorities could bring a criminal prose-
cution or enforcement action against the parent company of a
foreign subsidiary that has violated the regulations based on theo-
ries of imputed liability."
Moreover, the Commerce Department imposes administrative
sanctions under the EAR against foreign persons over which U.S.
forums have no jurisdiction through issuance of "denial orders."39
Denial orders typically ban shipments and transmissions to the
sanctioned person of all EAR-regulated items, which covers most
U.S.-origin commodities, software and technology. EAR denial
orders are commonly issued against foreign persons for reexport
violations."
2.2. Cuban Democracy Act and Helms-Burton Act
The Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in October 1992 as
part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 in
response to the Castro Regime's refusal to permit free elections
and disregard for human rights standards.41 Among other things,
the Cuban Democracy Act strengthened and expanded embargo
policies and authorized sanctions against other countries that
provide assistance to the Cuban government.
The Cuban Democracy Act was followed in March 1996 by
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity ("LIBERTAD")
Act, popularly known as the "Helms-Burton Act."42 The Helms-
" See, e.g., David, supra note 14, at 343 (quoting Professor Harold Maier
who, during a panel discussion, stated that France "put Fruehauf France, in ef-
fect, into operating receivership until the buses were delivered. Then control
went back to Fruehauf U.S.")
38 See Ellicott, supra note 12, at 136; 18 U.S.C. S 2(b) (1994); Nye & Nis-
sen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1994); Morgan, 149 F.2d at 187.
" 15 C.F.R. S 764.3(a)(2) (1998).
40 See, e.g., ISP International Spare Parts GmbH, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,504
(1996).
41 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-484, Title XVII, 106 Stat. 2578, (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 55 6001-
6010 (1994)).
42 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091
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Burton Act was precipitated by Cuba's act of shooting down two
unarmed airplanes flown by anti-Castro activists. Three aspects
of the statute are of particular concern to other countries and
have fueled calls for countermeasures: (1) provisions that codify
by statute and encourage intensive enforcement of the CACR; (2)
provisions that provide for a right of action to recover for "traf-
ficking," particularly by foreign persons, in property that was
confiscated by the Cuban government; and (3) provisions that bar
entry into the United States by natural persons who are "traffick-
ing" in confiscated property and certain related parties.
2.2.1. Strengthening and Codification of Embargo Against
Cuba
As noted above, the Cuban Democracy Act's "Mack
Amendment" forbids the issuance of licenses for commercial in-
tercourse with Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies,43
thereby exacerbating the extraterritorial impact of the CACR.
The Cuban Democracy Act also restricts trade with the United
States through use of vessels that have been used for trade with
Cuba or that carry goods in which there exists a Cuban interest.'
The Helms-Burton Act mandates that the U.S. embargo of
Cuba, including all restrictions imposed by the CACR, "remain
in effect" unless and until the embargo is suspended or terminated
consistent with statutory procedures.4" Those procedures make
suspension or termination of the embargo contingent on a change
of political power in Cuba.46
The statute directs the President to instruct the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Attorney General to "enforce fully" the
CACR.4" It also reinforces prohibitions against certain activities
already banned by the CACR.48
(Supp. II 1996)).
41 See 22 U.S.C. S 6005(a).
44 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b).
41 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (Supp. II 1996).
46 See 22 U.S.C.§ 6064.
47 22 U.S.C. § 6032(c).
41 See 22 U.S.C. § 6033 (prohibiting indirect financing transactions involv-
ing confiscated Cuban property); 22 U.S.C. 5 6040 (prohibiting imports of
products that are of Cuban origin, contain Cuban content or were located in
or transported through Cuba).
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2.2.2. Right-of-Action Against "Traffickers" in Confiscated
Property
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act would, if implemented (see
below), enable U.S. nationals to recover in U.S. courts from per-
sons who "traffic" in property to which the plaintiff has a claim if
the property was confiscated by the Cuban government after
January 1, 1959.4 ' The definition of "trafficking" broadly covers
not just dealing in but also benefiting from confiscated property. 0
Damages can equal the value of the claim as assessed by the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission (plus interest), the fair mar-
ket value of the subject property or triple either of these figures in
some circumstances. 1
There are various limitations on this right of action. Among
them, claims acquired from others, and claims that are not certi-
fied by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission are dis-
favored in several ways and the amount in controversy must ex-
ceed $50,000.52
2.2.3. Denial of Entry to "Traffickers" in Confiscated Property
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act directs the executive branch
to deny entrance into the United States by aliens who traffic in
41 See 22 U.S.C. S 6082.
50 With some exceptions, a person "traffics" in confiscated property for
purposes of Title Il if that person knowingly and intentionally commits the
following actions:
(i sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or other-
wise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives,
possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or
holds an interest in confiscated property,
iii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting
from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by
another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking ... through an-
other person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a
claim to the property.
22 U.S.C. § 6023(13).
SI See 22 U.S.C. S 6082(a)(l)-(3).
52 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4), (5) & (b).
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confiscated property that is subject to a claim by a U.S. person. 3
This provision also applies to corporate officers of, principals of
and shareholders with a controlling interest in an entity that "has
been involved in" trafficking in confiscated property that is the
subject of a claim by a U.S. national. 4 Spouses, agents, and minor
children of persons covered by these provisions are also to be ex-
cluded."
The alien-exclusion provisions cover only "trafficking" that
occurs after the law's enactment (March 12, 1996).6 The defini-
tion of "trafficking" varies in some respects from the definition
that applies to the right-of-action provisions; a congressional re-
port provides that the alien-exclusion definition of "trafficking" is
intended to omit "sale or abandonment of confiscated prop-
erty."" While the right-of-action provisions discussed above are
limited to property confiscated by the Cuban government after
January 1, 1959, no such limitation exists for the alien-exclusion
provisions."
" See 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a) (2).
14 22 U.S.C. S 6091(a) (3).
" See 22 U.S.C. S 6091(a)(4).
56 See 22 U.S.C. S 6091(a) & (d).
17 H.R. REP. No. 468, at 66 (1996). With some exceptions, a person"traf-
fics" in confiscated property for purposes of Title IV if that person knowingly
and intentionally commits the following actions:
(i)(i) transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property,
(II) purchases, receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires con-
fiscated property, or
(i) improves (other than for routine maintenance), invests in (by
contribution of funds or anything of value, other than for routine
maintenance), or begins after [the date of enactment of this Act,] to
manage, lease, possess, use, or hold aninterest in confiscated property,
iii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise bene-
iting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by
another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking . . .through an-
other person,
without the authorization of any United States national who holds a
claim to the property.
22 U.S.C. S 6091(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
" Compare 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4) (Supp. 1 1996) (limiting the term "confis-
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2.2.4. Authorization of Sanctions Against Foreign Persons
The Cuban Democracy Act authorizes the President to with-
hold from any country that provides "assistance" to the Cuban
government: (1) benefits under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961; (2) aid or sales under Arms Export Control Act; and (3) eli-
gibility for forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the United
States government." "Assistance" is defined as the provision of
something of value "on terms more favorable" than those avail-
able in the commercial market.60
2.2.5. Implementation
Liability under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act began inur-
ing to "traffickers" as of August 1, 1996.61 The President, how-
ever, has exercised his statutory authority to suspend the ability
to bring suit under Helms-Burton, and that suspension, which
must be renewed every six months, remains in place."
In June 1996, the State Department published procedures that
govern implementation of Title IV of the Act.63 Following these
procedures, the State Department has notified major shareholders
and senior executives of Sherritt International, a Canadian mining
cated" to "seizure" of property or"repudiation" of a debt by the Cuban gov-
ernment taking place "on or afterJanuary 1, 1959") with 22 U.S.C. S 6091(b)(1)
(making no such date restriction on the term "confiscated").
11 See 22 U.S.C. S 6003(b)(1) (1994).
60 See 22 U.S.C. S 6003(b)(2)(A) (1994).
61 See 22 U.S.C. S 6082(a)(1), 6085(a) (Supp. II 1996).
62 See Statement on Action on Title Ell of the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc.
1265 (July 16, 1996); Statement on Action on Title Ill of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 3 GJan. 3, 1997); Statement on Action on Title III of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1078 (July 16, 1997); Statement on Action on Title III of
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1966, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 81 (Jan. 16, 1998); Statement of Action on the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.1397-98 (July 16, 1998). The President may sus-
pend the right to bring suit under Title ImI for six-month intervals upon report-
ing to Congress that "the suspension is necessary to the national interests of
the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." 22
U.S.C. 5 6085(c)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
63 See Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996).
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company; senior executives of Grupo Domos, a Mexican tele-
communications firm; and, most recently, executives of the Israeli
citrus company Grupo B.M. that they and their families are
barred from entry into the United States under Helms-Burton.'
In July 1997, the Italian telecommunications company STET
agreed to compensate ITT of the United States for STET's use of
the Cuban telephone system on the grounds that it was confis-
cated from ITT.65 The agreement was apparently driven by
STET's desire to avoid Title IV sanctions, and the State Depart-
ment indicated that no sanctions would be forthcoming against
the company if the agreement were implemented.66
The President's suspension of the right to sue under Title III
and allegedly tepid implementation of Title IV have generated
opposition in Congress. 7 A recently enacted statute requires the
Secretary of State to report every three months to Congress on
implementation of the alien-exclusion provisions, including lists
of persons that the Secretary of State has determined are "traf-
fickers" in confiscated property.68 Members of Congress are also
considering an amendment to eliminate suspension of the right to
bring actions under Title 1H.69
6 See Michael Dobbs, U.S. Announces Measures Against Canadian Firm,
WASH. POST, July 11, 1996, at A14; WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18 & 19,
1997, at 2; Treasury Reviewing Wal-Mart Canada Decision to Sell Cuban-Made
Pajamas, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at A-15 (discuss-
ing the four additional Sherritt executives); Gary G. Yerkley, U.S., E. U. Making
'Significant' Progress in Helms-Burton Law Talks, Aide Says, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 13, 1998, at A-13. The State Department has also
forwarded inquiries to several other companies thought to be trafficking in
confiscated Cuban property. See id.
" See E. C. Says It Does Not Object to STET Settlement with 177, DAILY REP.
FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 25, 1997, at A-15.
66 See Department of State News Release, Implementation of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, July 23, 1997 (statement of
Nicholas Burns).
67 Preliminary conclusions of a congressional inquiry into the implementa-
tion of the Helms-Burton Act reportedly include a finding that Title IV inves-
tigations are being delayed by high-level State Department officials. See Gil-
man, Hamilton Square Off Over U.S.-EU Helms-Burton Agreement, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, July 17, 1998, at 6-7.
68 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, S 2802 (1998).
69 See E. U Warns It Will Reinstate Complaint on Helms-Burton if Congress
Tightens Law, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 12, 1997, at A-34
(quioting Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.)).
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2.3. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was enacted less than five
months after the Helms-Burton Act in August 1996.7" It was, ac-
cording to congressional findings, motivated principally by Iran's
and Libya's support for terrorism and efforts to acquire weapons
of mass destruction."' As with portions of the Cuban Democracy
Act described above, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act is a secon-
dary boycott measure which mandates the imposition of sanc-
tions against foreign companies and sometimes their affiliates in
response to petroleum-related investment in Iran and Libya and
certain other transactions with Libya.72
2.3.1. Triggering Events and Sanctions
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act specifies that the President
is to impose at least two of seven listed sanctions against foreign
persons who, on or after its date of enactment, August 5, 1996,
knowingly made an investment of US$40 million or more that
"directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement" of
Iran's or Libya's ability to develop its petroleum reserves.73 Re-
garding sanctions for investments in Iran, the investment thresh-
old is US$20 million as of August 5, 1997.' 4 The statute also gen-
erally requires imposition of at least two of the seven listed
sanctions against persons who, on or after August 5, 1996, know-
ingly provided to Libya equipment and other assistance (including
certain services) as prohibited by U.N. resolutions against Libya if
they "significantly and materially" contribute to Libya's military
or paramilitary capabilities or contribute to Libya's ability to de-
velop its petroleum resources or to maintain its aviation capabili-
ties. '
70 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1998)).
71 See 50 U.S.C.A S 2.
72 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5.
73 50 U.S.C.A. S 5(a) & (b)(2).
7' The Act provides that, for Iran, the $40 million threshold was to drop
to $20 million as of the anniversary of the Act's date of enactment with respect
to investments by nationals of countries that did not receive a waiver based on
their taking substantial steps to impede Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and support terrorism. See 50 U.S.C.A. % 2, 4(d)(1). The
President issued no such waivers.
7s See 50 U.S.C.A. S 5(b)(1) (citing G.A. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
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The seven types of sanctions from which the President is to
choose are: (1) denial of Export-Import Bank assistance for ex-
ports to the sanctioned party; (2) denial of licenses for exports to
the sanctioned party; (3) proscription on U.S. government pro-
curement of goods or services from the sanctioned party; (4) pro-
hibition on imports from the sanctioned party; (5) ban on loans
of more than US$10 million by U.S. financial institutions to the
sanctioned parties; (6) prohibition on service by the sanctioned
party as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds; and (7) pre-
clusion of service by the sanctioned party as a repository of U.S.
government funds. 6
2.3.2. Scope ofand Limitations on Sanctions Mandate
For purposes of triggering sanctions, "investments" include
entry into a contract to develop Iranian or Libyan petroleum re-
sources or to supervise or guarantee performance of such a con-
tract, purchase of a share of ownership in such a development, or
entry into a contract to share in royalties or profits in such a de-
velopment.' Covered investments do not include the entry into,
performance of, or financing of contracts to trade in goods, serv-
ices or technology. 8
The State Department, which has assumed the lead in admin-
istering the statute, has issued guidance on the question of
whether a contract for management services is a potentially cov-
ered "investment" or a non-covered "service contract." 9 A series
of factors are identified including whether the person involved
places capital at risk and receives a share of income or profits."
Sanctions are to be imposed on any person who has "carried
out" a triggering event and its successors." They are also to be
imposed on parents and subsidiaries of sanctioned companies if
they knowingly "engaged in" a triggering event and affiliates that
knowingly "engaged in" a triggering event and are controlled by
3063th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/R.ES/748 (1992) and G.A. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3312th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993)).
76 See 50 U.S.C.A. S 6.
' See 50 U.S.C.A. S 14(9) (defining the term"investment").
78 See id.
7' Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed.
Reg. 66,067-66,068 (1996).
80 See id.
81 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(c).
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the principal."2 According to the State Department guidance,
"engaging in" a triggering event can, for a parent, include facilitat-
ing or authorizing entry into a contract. 3
The President has some flexibility in determining whether
and for how long to impose sanctions. The President can pro-
spectively waive application of the Iran sanctions provisions to
nationals of a country if that country has "agreed to undertake
substantial measures, including economic sanctions," to deter Iran
from pursuing activities relating to terrorism and the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction.84 In addition, sanctions can
be waived in particular cases if, among other things, doing so is
"important to the national interests of the United States."" The
President is also authorized to exempt imports of components
that are essential to U.S. products or production from sanctions.86
Once established, sanctions are generally to be imposed for at
least a year.8 ' The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act will, by its cur-
rent terms, expire on August 5, 2001.88
2.3.3. Implementation
In January 1997, the State Department fulfilled a requirement
of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that the President publish a
list of significant oil and natural gas projects that have been ten-
dered by Iran.89
As of this writing, however, the United States has not im-
posed sanctions under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In a ma-
jor test case, the Clinton Administration defied substantial Con-
gressional pressure in May 1998 by waiving sanctions against the
French company Total SA and its Russian and Malaysian partners
for a US$2 billion investment to develop the Iranian South Pars
82 See id.
" See Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 66,067-66068 (1996).
84 50 U.S.C.A. § 4(c).
85 50 U.S.C.A. § 9(c).
86 See 50 U.S.C.A. 5(f(4).
87 See 50 U.S.C.A. 9(b).
88 See 50 U.S.C.A. 13(b).
89 See Significant Projects Which Have Been Tendered in the Oil and Gas
Sector in Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 1141 (1997). The State Department observed that
"[a] project's inclusion on or absence from the list should not be seen as rele-
vant to a determination on the imposition of sanctions." Id.
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natural gas field.9" This waiver was closely related to political ar-
rangements that the Administration and the European Commis-
sion also announced in May 1998 regarding trade and investment
issues (see below section 4). The State Department is continuing
to monitor other activities under the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, including plans by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group to build a
natural gas pipeline through Iran,91 development of Iran's Benges-
tan oil and gas reservoir,92 and plans by various European compa-
nies to undertake petroleum investments in Libya.93
Certain congressional leaders have vociferously criticized the
Clinton Administration's failure to impose sanctions under the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In response to the administration's
alleged failure to implement the Act, the foremost congressional
critic, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee, has announced his intention to seek
elimination of the statute's waiver provisions.94
3. SANCTIONS COUNTERMEASURES
3.1. EU Countermeasures
The Helms-Burton Act and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act led
to the EU's issuance of Council Regulation 2271/96 in Novem-
ber 1996.95 The regulation applies with respect to the Helms-
Burton Act, sanctions provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act,
the prohibitions, licensing provisions and penalty provisions of
the CACR, and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act ("Covered
See EU, US Avoid Clash on Cuba, Iran Trade Laws, WASH. TRADE
DAILY, May 19, 1998, at 1. The Administration issued a case-specific waiver
under section 9(c) of the Act rather than a broad, prospective waiver under sec-
tion 4(c). See id. (regarding "national interest" waiver).
9' See Hugh Pope, Shell's Planned Iran Pipeline Poses Test for U.S., WALL ST.
J., Mar. 16, 1998, at A15.
92 See David B. Ottaway & Martha M. Hamilton, BP Amoco Seeks to Drill
in Iran, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1999, at El.
91 See Senators Urge Albright Not to Grant ILSA Waivers for Libya Projects,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 29, 1998, at 14-15 (reporting efforts by several Sena-
tors to obtain Administration commitments to sanction such investments in
Libya).
9' See Gilman Announces Intent to Remove U.S. Ability to Waive ILSA Sanc-
tions, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 5, 1998, at 1-2.
9' Council Regulation 2271/96, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1.
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Sanctions") .96
Regulation 2271/96 introduced four principal countermea-
sures designed to counteract the Covered Sanctions:
Compliance "Blocking"- The regulation forbids EU persons,
"actively or by deliberate omission," to comply with require-
ments "based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from" the
Covered Sanctions "whether directly or through a subsidiary or
other intermediary person."97 The EU Commission is authorized
to allow persons to comply with a Covered Sanction in excep-
tional situations. 98
Non-Recognition of Judgments: The regulation prohibits the
recognition of judgments and administrative determinations that
give effect, "directly or indirectly," to the Covered Sanctions "or
to actions based thereon or resulting therefrom."99
"Clawback" Rights: EU persons engaging in commercial ac-
tivities between the EU and third countries are empowered to
"recover any damages.., caused to" such persons by the applica-
tion of a Covered Sanction "or by actions based thereon or result-
ing therefrom." "0
Reporting Requirements: The regulation requires EU persons
to report to the Commission (directly or through a Member
State) within thirty days instances in which "the economic
and/or financial interests" of the person "are affected, directly or
indirectly," by a Covered Sanction "or by actions based thereon
or resulting therefrom." 101
Regulation 2271/96 specifies that Member State penalties to
be imposed for violations of the regulation are to be "effective,
96 See id., Annex. The EU countermeasures regulation applies to citizens
of EU Member States, residents of the EU (apart from such residents in the
country of which they are citizens), other natural persons within the EU,
companies incorporated within the EU and persons the vessels of which are
registered in an EU member State. See id., art. 11; Council Regulation
4055/86, art. 1(2), 1986 OJ. (L 378) 1. Such persons are referenced herein as
"EU persons."
' Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 5, 1996 OJ. (L 309) 1.
98 See id.
99 id. art. 4.
100 Id. art. 6.
101 Id. art. 2. The EU Commission reinforced calls for reports under Regu-
lation 2271/71 in February 1997. See Neil Buckley, E. U. Seeks Help for Helms-
Burton Case, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at 5.
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proportional and dissuasive.""0 Furthermore, a regulation issued
coincidentally with Regulation 2271/96 directs the Members
States to take measures that they consider "necessary to protect
the interests" of EU persons who are affected by a Covered Sanc-
tion "insofar as these interests are not protected" under Regula-
tion 2271/96.03
In July 1997, the EU announced that it was initiating an inves-
tigation of STET under Regulation 2271/96 in light of the agree-
ment to compensate ITT for STET's use of the Cuban telephone
system discussed above in Section 2 .2.5. °4
3.2. Canadian Countermeasures
Although it was amended in response to the Helms-Burton
Act, Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (the
"FEMA") had been in place for over ten years when the Helms-
Burton Act and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act were enacted in
1996.0 Under the statute, countermeasures- including elements
largely like those contemplated by EU Regulation 2271/96- are
implemented through government orders.
3.2.1. FEMA Statute
The FEMA authorizes the Canadian Attorney General to is-
sue orders blocking compliance by "person[s] in Canada" with
non-Canadian trade laws that "adversely affect" Canadian trade
interests involving business carried on in Canada or that other-
wise infringe on Canadian sovereignty."6 A FEMA order can
also "require any person in Canada to give notice" regarding such
foreign measures. 07 If a foreign tribunal is exercising jurisdiction
in a manner that compromises Canada's trade and sovereignty in-
terests, the Attorney General is authorized to prohibit or restrict
the production of records and the giving of information in con-
102 Supra note 95, art. 9.
103 Joint Action of 22 Nov., 1996, art. 1, 1996 OJ. (L 309) 7.
104 See E.U. Begins Investigation of Italian Firm for Voting E.U. Anti-Helms-
Burton Rules, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Jul. 31, 1997, at A-2.
105 See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985) (Can.)
[hereinafter FEMA].
106 FEMA S 5(1). Such orders require the concurrence of the Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs. See id.
107 Id.S 5(1)(a).
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nection with foreign legal proceedings.' 8
Canada amended the FEMA in response to Helms-Burton in
late 1996.109 The FEMA amendments authorize the Canadian At-
torney General to order the non-recognition and non-
enforcement of judgements by foreign tribunals under foreign
trade laws that "adversely affect" Canadian interests."' In addi-
tion, the amendments authorize clawback suits by Canadian per-
sons to recover payments made to satisfy judgments handed down
under the Helms-Burton Act and other foreign laws that are ac-
tionable under the FEMA."' Finally, the FEMA amendments
authorize the Canadian Attorney General, with the concurrence
of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to maintain a sched-
ule of non-Canadian trade laws that are, in the Attorney Gen-
eral's view, "contrary to international law or international com-
ity," the initial entry on which is the Helms-Burton Act."'
As amended, FEMA penalties for compliance with objection-
able foreign laws and other violations include fines of up to
C$1,500,000 for corporations and C$150,000 for individuals along
with imprisonment of individuals for up to five years.'
3.2.2. FEMA Order
In October 1992, the Canadian Attorney General issued an
order under the FEMA directing Canadian-organized companies
not to comply with the "Mack Amendment," which the United
108 See id. § 3(1)(a)-(c). The FEMA authorizes courts to issue warrants for
the temporary seizure o any records if there is reason to believe that the Ca-
nadian Attorney General's blocking order will be disobeyed, and the records
are likely to be turned over to foreign authorities. See id. § 4.
109 See Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C.,
ch. 28 (1997) (Can.).
110 FEMA § 8(1)(a). The amendments establish that any judgment under
the Helms-Burton Act is not to be recognized or enforced in Canada. Act to
Amend FEMA, § 7(1). Before the 1996 amendments, FEMA non-recognition
and clawback provisions related only to antitrust actions.
.. See id. % 8(l), 9(1). If a non-recognition order cannot be issued because
the judgement was satisfied outside Canada or the judgment is under the
Helms-Burton Act, the Canadian Attorney General can issue an order declar-
ing that a Canadian person has clawback rights with respect to the judgment.
See id.
~8(1)(b)-
11 Id. E 5(l), 8.
,,' See FEMA § 7(1).
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States enacted that year as part of the Cuban Democracy Act."'
As discussed above in section II.A.1, the Mack Amendment effec-
tively precluded, as a matter of United States law, U.S.-owned or
controlled foreign companies from trading with Cuba by prevent-
ing the issuance of requisite licenses under the CACR. x15
In light of concerns about proposals in the U.S. Congress that
led to the Helms-Burton Act, the FEMA order was amended in
January 1996 to cover the CACR directly and any other United
States measure "having a purpose similar to that of the" CACR
(presumably, preventing economic intercourse with Cuba).116
The amendment broadened the order's blocking provision, and it
now specifies that
[n]o Canadian corporation and no director, officer, man-
ager or employee in a position of authority of a Canadian
corporation shall, in respect of any trade or commerce be-
tween Canada and Cuba, comply with an extraterritorial
measure of the United States [i.e., the CACR or a similar
measure] or with any directive, instruction, intimation of
policy or other communication relating to such a measure
that the Canadian corporation or [corporate official] has
received from a person who is in a position to direct or in-
fluence the policies of the Canadian corporation in Can-
ada.1
17
It appears that the order was designed to reach not only U.S.
government mandates but also "communications" from U.S. cor-
porate parents to their Canadian subsidiaries to the effect that the
14 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, 126 C.
Gaz. Part 14049 (1992); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. It would seem that the
Canadian order should have been directed at the CACR themselves rather than
the Mack Amendment to effectuate the goal of blocking the impact of U.S.
sanctions.
116 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, amend.,
130 C. Gaz. Part H" 611 (1996). The amendment clarifies that the order applies
with respect to CACR prohibitions on trade in services and technology as well
as trade in goods and applies with respect to the CACR ban on business with
parties deemed by the Treasury Department to be"specially designated nation-
als" of Cuba. See id. § 2, at 612.
117 Id. § 5, at 613.
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subsidiaries should comply with the U.S. embargo of Cuba."'
The amended order provides further that the blocking order ap-
plies to an "act or omission constituting compliance" with such a
measure or communication "whether or not compliance with
that measure or communication is the only purpose of the act or
omission.""9
Finally, the FEMA order directs Canadian corporations and
their directors and officers to notify the Canadian Attorney Gen-
eral of any "communication" relating to the CACR or a similar
measure "from a person who is in a position to direct or influence
the policies of the Canadian corporation in Canada."
121
3.3. Countermeasures of Other Jurisdictions
In reaction to the Helms-Burton Act, Mexico enacted the Law
to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Laws that Contra-
vene International Law in October 1996.12' The Mexican statute
contains several elements included among the EU and Canadian
countermeasures. Mexican parties and, oddly, foreign persons
acts of whom "produce effects" in Mexican territory are forbid-
den "to engage in acts that affect trade and investment when such
acts are the consequence of the extraterritorial effects of foreign
statutes."" The Mexican law provides for the non-recognition
and non-enforcement of foreign judgments issued under such
laws."2 Mexican parties can pursue clawback claims to recover
damages under the extraterritorial foreign laws. 24 Finally, the
... Canada Amends Order Blocking U.S. Trade Restrictions, Gov't of
Canada News Release, No. 8 (Jan. 18, 1996). The Canadian government an-
nounced that the amended order would "oblig[e] U.S. subsidiaries in Canada to
deal on a normal business basis with 'specially designated nationals"' identified
as sanctioned persons under the CACR. Id.
119 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Order, S 6, at 613.
120 Id. § 3(1), at 612.
121 "Ley de Protecci6n al Comercio y la Inversi6n de Normas Extranjeras
que Contravengan el Derecho Internacional," D.O., 22 de octubre de 1996.
122 Id. art. 1. A foreign statute is deemed to have "extraterritorial effects"
if its objectives include: (1) blocking trade with or investment in a country to
encourage political change in that country; (2) allowing "claiming payments
from individuals derived from expropriations" made in such country; or
(3) restricting entry into the country that enacted the statute to further the
goals of (1) or (2). id.
123 See id. art. 4
124 See id. art. 5.
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statute includes provisions forbidding responses to inquiries from
foreign countries under extraterritorial measures and requiring
notification to the Mexican government of such inquiries or ac-
tivities that may be impeded by the foreign laws."z
The EU's Regulation 2271/96 was preceded by a series of
countermeasures enacted by EU members. The United King-
dom's Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, among other
things, authorizes the UK Secretary of State to "give to any per-
son in the United Kingdom who carries on business there such
directions for prohibiting compliance" with non-UK measures
that govern international trade in a way that damages UK trading
interests.1 26 Other EU members, such as Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, reportedly
also maintain countermeasures with one or more standard ele-
ments such as blocking, non-recognition, clawback and reporting
provisions."
4. INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. SANCTIONS AND
EFFORTS TO RECONCILE CONFLICTING POLICIES
In October 1996, the EU initiated World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute settlement proceedings against the Helms-
Burton Act and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The EU alleged that
these measures deny EU members' rights under General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") to export to Cuba and
125 See id. arts. 2 & 3.
126 Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, ch. 11, S 1 (Eng.). In re-
sponse to the Mack Amendment, see Section 2.1.1, the UK issued the Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, S 1 (3) (Eng.) (US Cuban Assets
Control Regulations) Order 1992 to block compliance by U.S.-owned UK
companies with the CACR prohibition on trade with Cuba. The Extraterrito-
rial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of
Trading Interests) Order 1996 was issued to reconcile the 1992 order with EU
Regulation 2271/96.
12 See R. Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GA 7T: State Sov-
ereignty and the Enforcement of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 315, 317 (1995) ("To protect [their] sovereignty from out-
side incursion, many [foreign] governments enacted blocking statutes to pre-
vent compliance with U.S discovery orders within their borders."); see, e.g.,
Derek Devgun, Commission Proposes Response to U.S. Cuba Legislation: Ameri-
can Firms That Sue Could Face Retaliation in the E. U., EUROWATCH, Sept. 16,
1996.
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trade in Cuban origin goods.128 The EU also articulated major
concerns about the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act but did not in-
clude that statute in its WTO case.
The United States pressed the EU to discontinue the panel
proceedings on the grounds that the Helms-Burton Act involves
foreign policy and national security issues outside the ambit of
the GATT 1994 and GATS. There were indications that the
United States might defend the measure before the panel through
invocation of the GATT and GATS national security exemp-
tions, but, instead, the United States announced upon formation
of the panel that it simply would not participate in the case." 9
Concerns emerged that disregard of a panel decision by the
United States would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO.
Since the fall of 1996, the United States and the EU have in-
termittently pursued negotiations regarding EU concerns over the
Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and U.S.
proposals for coordinated sanctions policies. In December 1996,
the EU advanced those negotiations by adopting a "Common Po-
sition" on Cuba that emphasized an EU policy of securing a tran-
sition in Cuba to "pluralist democracy and respect for human
rights."13 The Clinton Administration viewed the Common Po-
sition as a positive step that helped justify continued suspension
of the right to bring suit under Title III of the Helms-Burton
Act.1
31
128 See Statement by the Representative of the European Communities and
Their Member States at the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, Oct. 16,
1996; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 in Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement] Annex 1B, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
Canada and Mexico became third party participants in the EU's WTO chal-
lenge. DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Nov. 21, 1996, at A-3.
12 See Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at A12. It appears that the Clinton Administra-
tion proceeded on the basis that the United States had discretion to determine
unilaterally whether the agreements' national security provisions applied.
,' Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the
Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty of the European Union, on Cuba, 1996 OJ.
(L 322) 1.
3 ' See Statement on Action on Title Ili of the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 3,
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In April 1997, immediately before the due date for the EU's
first substantive submission regarding the WTO case, the United
States and the EU announced an "understanding" on the basis of
which the WTO case was placed in abeyance. 32 The April 1997
accord specified that the United States and the EU would con-
tinue discussions with a goal of developing by October 15, 1997
"disciplines and principles for the strengthening of investment
protection" and "principles" to "address and resolve" the "issue
of conflicting jurisdictions."' 33 The United States noted that its
"presumption of continued suspension of Title III" of the Helms-
Burton Act was predicated on the EU's and other allies' contin-
ued "stepped up efforts to promote democracy in Cuba."'34 The
document specified that the "U.S. Administration" would seek
from Congress the authority to waive Title IV of the Helms-
Burton Act. 3 ' Negotiations continued into the spring of 1998
notwithstanding the parties' failure to meet the October 1997
deadline. The EU's suspended WTO challenge expired in April
1998 in accordance with WTO dispute settlement rules, although
the EU remains free to bring a new case.
In May 1998, the United States and the EU concluded a
"Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation" ("Partner-
ship Accord") and an "Understanding with Respect to Disciplines
for the Strengthening of Investment Protection" ("Investment
Understanding"). The Partnership Accord includes limited
commitments to forego new extraterritorial sanctions.'36 The
Clinton Administration and the European Commission (EU ex-
ecutive body) agreed "not to seek or propose" and to "resist" "the
passage of new economic sanctions legislation based on foreign
4 Jan. 3, 1997). Canada and Cuba issued a"Joint Declaration" in January 1997
which reinforced their bilateral relationship, including commercial aspects of
the relationship. See Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration on Cooperation on Po-
litical, Economic, and Social Issues, Jan. 22, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 210 (1997). This
was not viewed with favor by the United States.
132 European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Con-
cerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,
April 11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529, 530 (1997).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 529.
135 See id. at 530.
136 See Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation, May 18, 1998,
2(h), reprinted in EU-U.S. Declaration on Political Cooperation, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 22, 1998, at 23-7.
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policy grounds which is designed to make economic operators of
the other [partner] behave in a manner similar to that required of
[the partner's] own economic operators."13
In return for that commitment, the EU conditionally agreed
(as did the United States) in the Investment Understanding to im-
pose certain sanctions against persons who invest in or undertake
certain other transactions with respect to property that was con-
fiscated in violation of international law. Unlike the Helms-
Burton Act, the Investment Understanding commitments do not
apply to past transactions. The sanctions include, among other
things, denial of public credit and, in some circumstances, prohi-
bition of the transaction.13
The United States and the EU agreed to jointly propose that
the sanctions commitments set forth in the Investment Under-
standing be established as legal obligations as part of the Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment,139 which was then being negoti-
ated under the auspices of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Pending that outcome, the EU
simply stated its intention in the Investment Understanding to
apply the sanctions "on a policy basis."140 Furthermore, even this
limited commitment is contingent on the United States waiving
application of Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act (the alien-
exclusion provisions) to EU persons," which would require that
the Act be amended. The EU issued a statement indicating that
its implementation of sanctions commitments in the Investment
Understanding and its continuing to forego a WTO challenge de-
pended not only on a Title IV waiver but also on: (1) the absence
137 Id.
138 See Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of
Investment Protection, May 18, 1998, S I.B <http://www.eurunion.org/news
/invest.htm >. A party to the Investment Understanding is to apply the iden-
tified sanctions if: (1) an international tribunal or court of the expropriating
state determines that the property was expropriated in contravention of inter-
national law; (2) such a determination is made by the parties to the Investment
Understanding or under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (if that
agreement is established); or (3) the party itself makes such a determination.
See id. S I.B.1. Prohibition of the transaction is to be mandatory only upon a
finding of illegality under international law by an international tribunal, court
of the expropriating state or the parties to the Investment Understanding or
under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. See id. § I.B.
139 See id. 11.2.
140 Id.
141 See id. 11.4.
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of sanctions against EU persons under the Iran and Libya Sanc-
tions Act; and (2) continued waivers under Helms-Burton Act Ti-
tle Ill (right-of-action provisions)., Prospects for securing bind-
ing sanctions commitments from the EU deteriorated later in
1998 when the Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotia-
tions ended unsuccessfully.143
Moreover, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), Chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, and other congressional sup-
porters of the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanc-
tions Act responded that the Investment Understanding was
insufficient to warrant amending Title IV to allow for an EU
waiver."' To date, efforts to amend Title IV and thereby bring
the Investment Understanding sanctions commitments into force
have made little progress. Administration officials are reportedly
debating seeking additional commitments or statements from the
EU that might facilitate action on Title IV. 4'
In June 1996, Canada and Mexico announced their intention
to challenge the Helms-Burton Act under the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 4' They have not pressed
forward with the case, however. Canada indicated that it would
continue to delay the challenge pending the outcome of the
U.S./EU negotiations 47 and has not taken action since the con-
142 See EU Unilateral Statement, May 18, 1998, <http://www.europa.
eu.int/comm/dg0l/0518uni.htm>. In its statement, the EU indicated that
any new WTO panel that it might bring would challenge not only the Helms-
Burton Act but also the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. See id. In a reference to
the planned Iran pipeline project discussed above in Section 2.3.3., the EU
statement provided that "it is axiomatic that infrastructural investment in the
transport of oil and gas through Iran be carried out without impediment." Id.
143 See Lawrence J. Speer, OECD Countries Kill MAI Talks But Say World
Still Needs Rules, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, BNA Dec. 4, 1998, at A-9.
144 See, e.g., Helms, Gilman Call for Specific Changes to U.S.-EU Sanctions
Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 19, 1998, at 1, 18-19 (reprinting a letter from
Sen. Jesse Helms and Rep. Benjamin Gilman to Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright).
145 See Administration, Congress Examining Different Ways to Solve Helms-
Burton, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 14, 1998, at 5-6.
146 See Anne Swardson, Canada Vows Sanctions Against U.S. for Enforce-
ment of Anti-Cuba Trade Law, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A7; North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
296, 297 (1993) (citing as its purpose the reduction of trade barriers and the es-
tablishment of mutually advantageous trade laws).
147 See International Trade: Canada Delays Challenge of Helms-Burton Pend-
ing EU Negotiations with United States, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA),
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clusion of the Investment Understanding.
As of February 1999, there are no active challenges to U.S.
sanctions under trade agreements, and the Clinton Administra-
tion has made limited commitments to resist further extraterrito-
rial sanctions. At the same time, there remains no solid prospect
of a resolution that would reconcile U.S. extraterritorial sanctions
with the laws of other countries. In this regard, there apparently
have been no international negotiations on U.S. trading partners'
concerns about U.S. embargo regulations (e.g., the CACRs) or
negotiations that might lead to the revocation of sanctions coun-
termeasures.
5. DIFFICULTIES WHEN SANCTIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES
OVERLAP
The foremost problem for a firm caught between conflicting
U.S. sanctions and foreign countermeasures is, of course, the po-
tential for legal liability. Wal-Mart's Canadian subsidiary faced
the possibility of multimillion dollar fines under the U.S. Trading
With Enemy Act for sales of Cuban merchandise and the same
under the Canadian FEMA for discontinuing such sales. Both
statutes also provide for imprisonment of individual offenders.
Depending on the circumstances, foreign countermeasures
might provide a defense to prosecution under or civil enforce-
ment of U.S. sanctions in light of the "foreign state compulsion
doctrine" of international law. Under the foreign state compul-
sion doctrine, a country is not to prevent a person from taking
action in another country that is required by the laws of that
country."' Making reference to this doctrine, some U.S. court
opinions indicate that a party should not be held criminally or
civilly liable under U.S. law for activity in a foreign country that
is compulsory under the laws of that country.149
Feb. 14, 1997, at A-37.
148 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note
13, § 441 (1).
141 See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7thCir.
1980) (expressing intent not to "interfere" with foreign sovereign's laws); Tim-
berlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597,
607 (9th Cir. 1976), affid, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to pass on va-
lidity of foreign laws); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307
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There are several potential impediments to reliance on the
foreign state compulsion doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court has
not affirmed use of the doctrine as a defense to criminal or civil
actions, and the theory that it should be so applied is derived
largely from lower court dicta."' While the contours of a success-
ful defense are not clear even among lower courts, some have de-
termined that the defense will succeed only if a balance of inter-
ests favors sustaining the policy of the foreign country.' It also
seems clear that a court will intensely scrutinize whether the for-
eign policy is genuinely mandatory. The Restatement of U.S.
Foreign Relations Law specifies that "guidance" or "informal
communications" issued by the foreign country are insufficient to
support a defense of foreign government compulsion." 2
Apart from legal liability, the conundrum of overlapping U.S.
sanctions and foreign countermeasures can give rise to serious
government affairs and public relations problems. Reports indi-
cate that difficulties arose for Wal-Mart when shoppers familiar
with the extraterritorial scope of the U.S. embargo noticed cloth-
ing with "Made in Cuba" tags in the company's Winnipeg, Mani-
toba store. Due to public scrutiny, the company was forced to
issue statements about its response to the issue (first removal of
the products and then their return).'
150 The foreign state compulsion doctrine has been used successfully as a
defense in at least one instance. See Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298 (up-
holding use of the doctrine in antitrust litigation). See also O.N.E. Shipping
Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 453 (2dCir. 1987)
(implying that the foreign state compulsion doctrine could represent a basis for
insulation from liability apart from the primary basis relied upon by court).
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has implied that the doc-
trine is inapplicable in cases regarding international contract disputes. See
McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9thCir. 1989). The
Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the doctrine does
not apply to the granting of patents. See Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694
F.2d 300, 303 (3dCir. 1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
151 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903-04 (2d
Cir. 1968) (holding that the need to enforce a U.S. subpoena outweighed Ger-
man interests under bank secrecy law).
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 13,
at S 441 cmt. c.
153 See John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Pulls Cuban Pajamas From Canada, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 6, 1997, at A3; John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Puts Cuban Goods Back on
Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1997, at A3.
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6. APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING PROBLEMS
Multinational companies- particularly those with operations
in the United States and jurisdictions with sanctions countermea-
sures- are well-served by formulating and implementing a care-
fully considered approach to minimizing problems under U.S.
sanctions and foreign countermeasures.
Companies for whom sanctions and countermeasures are
most problematic are typically U.S. multinationals that have sub-
sidiaries in jurisdictions with countermeasures. Some such corpo-
rate groups have chosen, for business and other reasons, to have
the foreign subsidiary operate wholly independently and without
direction from the parent. This model can be useful in insulating
the parent from imputed liability for the actions of the subsidiary
under agency, accomplice and conspiracy theories, although it
will not obviate potential conflict between U.S. and local law vis-
a-vis the foreign subsidiary.
Typically, the parent will have some level of operational con-
trol over the foreign subsidiary. If so, it is advisable for the com-
pany to take steps to exercise that control in a fully informed and
thoughtful manner designed to avoid liability under U.S. sanc-
tions and, to the extent possible, minimize difficulties with coun-
termeasures.
Steps that might be considered include the following:
Review Foreign Operations for Potential Exposure Under U.S.
Sanctions: The U.S. parent should understand the extent of po-
tential exposure based on a thorough review of the foreign sub-
sidiary's international business activities. It should know, for ex-
ample, whether there is any prospect that the subsidiary will
engage in business with Cuba or Cuban nationals if not con-
strained from doing so by the parent. U.S. legal requirements
should be examined to assess, for example, whether the foreign
subsidiary can avail itself of U.S. regulatory exemptions.
Ensure that the U.S. Parent Does Not Direct or Facilitate Non-
compliance by the Foreign Subsidiary with U.S. Sanctions: This re-
quires a clear understanding of U.S. law and foreign operations.
Establish Compliance Program Covering Foreign Subsidiary:
Even absent conscious direction from the parent to violate the
law, the parent invites problems under U.S. sanctions if it exer-
cises operational control over its foreign subsidiaries but fails to
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establish rules and procedures designed to ensure compliance with
U.S. extraterritorial requirements."' The compliance program
should include elements on transaction-specific compliance
checks, training regarding sanctions requirements and periodic
compliance reviews. Compliance procedures should provide that
instances of conflict between the laws of two jurisdictions will be
decided by senior management of the subsidiary based on the ad-
vice of counsel.
Consider Pursuing U.S. Authorization as Appropriate: U.S.
agencies generally do not license activity that is subject to sanc-
tions regulations. Depending on the circumstances, however, the
U.S. government might license actions by a foreign entity to
avoid precipitating an international dispute. At the same time,
seeking a U.S. license might exacerbate exposure for the foreign
subsidiary under a countermeasure.
When Sanctioned Countries Are Avoided, Document Business
Reasons for Doing So: A foreign subsidiary's avoidance of activity
within the scope of U.S. sanctions might be attributable to rea-
sons unrelated to sanctions. The marketing area of the subsidiary
might, for example, exclude Cuba for business reasons. For pur-
poses of addressing inquiries under countermeasures, it is useful
to be able to produce documentation of such business arrange-
ments that are contemporaneous with their establishment."' 5
Consider Steps to Prevent Participation by U.S. Persons in For-
eign Subsidiary's Business: Depending on the circumstances, the
management of the foreign subsidiary might be compelled by
countermeasures to take action that is in noncompliance with
U.S. sanctions. In this regard, the company should bear in mind
the risk that liability for sanctions violations can inure to indi-
viduals who are U.S. nationals or permanent residents. If there is
a significant possibility that the subsidiary will be forced to take
action in violation of U.S. sanctions, it would be advisable that
there be no U.S. nationals or permanent residents among the sub-
154 If the subsidiary is Canadian, it would be prudent to obtain the advice
of Canadian counsel on the potential application of the FEMA order's prohibi-
tion on certain "communications" relating to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. See
supra Section 3.2.2.
155 At the same time, the Canadian FEMA order indicates that its prohibi-
tion on compliance with the U.S. embargo of Cuba extends to instances in
which acting consistently with the embargo is even partially motivated by the
embargo or a related "communication" from a corporate parent. See supra Sec-
tion 2.2.2.
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sidiary's directors, officers and employees.
7. CONCLUSION
Although U.S. extraterritorial sanctions are drawing in-
creasing criticism in the United States and abroad, the prospects
for broad repeal of these measures are small. Indeed, it is not un-
likely that additional extraterritorial sanctions will emerge in the
next few years. At the same time, foreign sanctions countermea-
sures are likely to remain in place given the Clinton Administra-
tion's inability to negotiate harmonized sanctions policies with
U.S. trading partners. In these circumstances, precluding legal li-
ability under both U.S. sanctions and countermeasures can be a
major challenge, particularly for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. com-
panies.
In many cases, businesses may be unable to resolve this type
of conundrum entirely. It is prudent not to ignore the problem,
however. Fully informed, judicious planning can reduce risks
significantly.
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